The paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James' radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead's notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead's view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called "perspectives". According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead's concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called "constructive realism."
Introduction
In the following I am going to propose an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). The problem of epistemological constructionism, needless to say, belongs to those which are most persistent in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I do not aspire to settle this dispute once and for all. Nevertheless, with the help of classical pragmatist philosophy, more specifically, the theories of perception and action by George H. Mead, John Dewey, and William James, I would like to suggest how we might find a third way of thinking about epistemological constructionism. To this end, the paper will, first, analyze the pragmatist concept of the goaldirectedness of action, especially with regard to Mead's notion of attitudes. Subsequently, it will relate these to certain enactivist theories of perception provided by contemporary cognitive sciences (Humberto Maturana, Giacomo Rizzolatti, Corrado Sinigaglia, Andy Clark, etc.) . Against this background, it will present a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment, its objects and structures, in terms of possibilities for action. Next, the paper will elaborate on Mead's concept of "perspectives." In Mead's view, perspectives are stable patterns of organism-environment interactions within which objects and events of the perceived world emerge. According to pragmatism as well as the enactive branches of cognitive science (embodied and extended cognition, for instance), perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes taking place in our heads, but in a direct manner, also the world itself. Against the conceptual background of Mead's concept of perspectives, the paper will defend a position called "constructive realism", which holds that environmental structures and events in our experience exist objectively, albeit only insofar as we are capable of skillfully engaging our world.
Goal-directedness of action: Mead's concept of attitudes
In the revised version of his famous book, The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor says the following about the philosophy of pragmatism: "Pragmatism is Cartesianism read from right to left, the genius of pragmatism is to get all explanatory priorities backward" (2008, 14) . According to Fodor's theory of methodological solipsism, in order to explain cognition, scientific psychology should focus exclusively on the processes taking place in our heads. Since, for Fodor, all the phenomena necessary for explaining the nature of cognitive processes are to be found within our skulls, regardless of the external world, it is no wonder that further in the book, Fodor contends that Descartes was right and pragmatism was and is wrong in claiming the exact opposite. The aforementioned Fodorian position, appropriately referred to by Erkki Kilpinen as "the mind-first explanation" (2008) of cognition and action, is indeed an untenable one, from the pragmatist perspective.
1 From the viewpoint of the "empirically responsible" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, xi; Kilpinen 2013, 3-20) and the scientific philosophy that the classical pragmatists pursued, the "methodologically solipsist" (cf. Fodor 1980, 63-73) approach of the Fodorian sort is an Aristotelian, pre-Darwinian, and consequently-pre-scientific-anachronism, originating in the belief that the nature of things can be figured out regardless of the process of their development.
For George Herbert Mead, as well as for the rest of the representatives of the pragmatist philosophical tradition, it is the bodily action that must be taken to be the very starting point of any inquiry into the nature of cognition. Action (or behavior) is the ultimate matrix within which the dialectic of means and ends necessarily unfolds. As David Franks puts it, for pragmatists:
behavior must be taken as a 'given' and all analysis proceeded from it. Behavior just is and needs no further explanation. Every infant comes into the world as a squirming, kicking monument to motor behavior … Thought is the servant of behavior, not the other way around (2010, 87) .
1 "What the behaviorist does, or ought to do, is to take the complete act, the whole process of conduct, as the unit in his account. In doing that he has to take into account not simply the nervous system but also the rest of the organism, for the nervous system is only a specialized part of the entire organism. Consciousness as stuff, as experience, from the standpoint of behavioristic or dynamic psychology, is simply the environment of the human individual or social group in so far as constituted by or dependent upon or existentially relative to that individual or social group" (Mead 1934 (Mead /1967 .
The central nervous system (CNS) is a late evolutionary phenomenon which developed to co-ordinate sensorimotor activities in gradually more and more complex multi-cellular organisms, thus facilitating the processes of their adjustment to environmental changes (cf. Maturana and Varela 1998, 142-163) . We can therefore agree with Mark Johnson in saying that: "At the heart of all pragmatist philosophy is the fundamental understanding that thinking is doing, and that cognition is action" (2007, 92) .
According to Johnson, the guiding principle in the naturalist approach to mind, especially in Mead and Dewey, is the principle of continuity. The principle of continuity originates in Mead's pragmatism 2 which he shared and helped to develop with his former colleague and lifelong friend, John Dewey. Mark Johnson describes this principle, which both Mead and Dewey endorsed, in terms of two main characteristics: i) higher-lower continuity is a twofold thesis that so-called "higher" organisms are not the result of some additional ontological kind emerging in the history of the world, and also that our higher cognitive capacities (such as reason, will or empathy) are not distinct in nature from the lower ones (perception, emotion etc.); ii) inner-outer continuity, on the other hand, is the denial that what is "inner" (e.g., the mental) needs ontological principles for its explanation that differ from those used to explain the outer (e.g., the physical) (2007, (122) (123) . For both Mead and Dewey, the principle of continuity provided a heuristic basis for the rejection of ontological and epistemological dualisms. There is no hard-and-fast divide between either cognition and action, or mind and body. In other words, both mind and cognition are organically conditioned tools by means of which organisms epistemically organize their world.
The life process itself, if we define it in terms of a continuous process of disruption and restoration of the homeostatic equilibrium of organisms, is a process of cognition: "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system" (Maturana 1970, 13) . Mead embodied this belief in his "theory of the act", which represented a considerable elaboration of Dewey's criticism of the reflex arc concept in psychology (cf. Dewey 1896, 2 It is often overlooked that Mead not only shared Dewey's pragmatism but also helped to shape a considerable part of it. As Jane M. Dewey writes in an authorized biography of her father: "The psychologists and philosophers who, up to that time, had recognized any connection between psychological phenomena and the human body had found the physical basis of mind in the brain alone or at most in the nervous system isolated from the whole organism, and thus from the relations of the organism to its environment. Mead, on the contrary, started from the idea of the organism acting and reacting in an environment; in this view the nervous system, brain included, is an organ for regulating the relations of the organism as a whole with objective conditions of life. Psychological phenomena, including processes of thought and knowledge, must then be described from this point of view. Mead had also developed an original theory of the psychical as the state occurring when previously established relations of organism and environment break down and new relations have not yet been built up; and, through inclusion of relations of human beings with one another, a theory of the origin and nature of selves. Dewey did not attempt a development of these special ideas, but he took them over from Mead and made them a part of his subsequent philosophy…" (Dewey in Schilpp 1939, 25-26, original italics) . Similarly, in the preface to Mind, Self, and Society Charles W. Morris contends: "Neither stands to the other in the exclusive relation of teacher to student; both, in my opinion, were of equal, though different intellectual stature; both shared in a mutual give-and-take according to their own particular genius. If Dewey gave range and vision, Mead gave analytical depth and scientific precision" (Morris in Mead 1934 Mead /1967 . [357] [358] [359] [360] [361] [362] [363] [364] [365] [366] [367] [368] [369] [370] , along with all versions of stimulus-response behaviorism. From the perspective of Mead's naturalist conception of action, "an act" is the most primitive unit of behavior, and its most distinctive characteristic to be found is its goal-or purpose-directedness: "All acts, as such, are teleological. They move toward a result which is a success or failure" (n.d./2011, 21). Although Mead used this term mostly when explaining the nature of action in higher organisms (humans especially), its content is far more comprehensive. As Cornelis de Waal laconically puts it: "it applies to activities as diverse as a plant turning its leaves to the sun and surfing the internet for affordable car insurance" (2002, 19) . By their very nature, acts are inherently goal-directed-regardless of whether they are conscious or not, their aim is either to sustain the organism's well-being (e.g., searching for food) or to bring about certain changes in the course of organic behavior. For Mead, as well as for some contemporary cognitive scientists (cf. Bogdan 1994); Maturana and Varela (1998) , this kind of goaldirectedness and self-sustaining selectivity is the basic characteristic of life:
We assume purposive acts in nature, plants, animals, etc., that are more than the energies constituting them, at least from the non-mechanical viewpoint. Such purposiveness is independent of any mind; organisms maintain themselves and in their action they proceed toward ends, and when the end is reached the act ceases … Wherever we find living forms we find acts (Mead 1927 (Mead /1982 .
In the case of organisms with a highly developed CNS, the structure of the act, Mead held, was delineated by four functional stages: impulse, perception, manipulation and consummation. Mead defined an impulse as "a congenital tendency to react in a specific manner to a certain sort of stimulus, under certain environmental conditions" (1934/1967, 337) . Consummation, in turn, simply refers to successful completion of the act.
3 The neurologically realized bodily dispositions encoding perceived objects in terms of possible reactions toward them were dubbed by Mead as attitudes. Mead postulated the existence of attitudes for two reasons: 1) to avoid the mechanistic stimulus-response psychology, demolished earlier by Dewey (1896) , and no less importantly, 2) to provide a plausible account of the nature of intelligent action. Mead suspected that in the physiological makeup of higher order organisms, attitudes take the form of neural pathways, and defined them as beginnings of acts in terms of specific readiness of an organism to perform all sorts of responses towards perceptual objects. From the perspective of the organism's experience, attitudes enable values to emerge. For Mead, values are not to be seen as purely subjective items added to the objective properties of objects. On the contrary, they are part of the lifeprocess as they enable the organism to discriminate and give preference to environmental structures vital for its survival.
Living isn't simply a cognitive process; it's also an emotive process of sense-making, of bringing signification and value into existence. In this way the world becomes a place of valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or escape, as Evan Thompson (2004, 386) aptly puts it. For Mead, attitudes are inner, however, "not in the sense of being in another world, a subjective world, but in the sense of being within the organism" (1934/1967, 5) . Attitudes are an integral part of the act 4 although they are not subject to direct observation: "The external act that we observe is a part of the process which has started from within" (ibid.). On the basis of the organism's active behavior and problem solving, attitudes come into existence as neural pathways encoding bodily habits which respond to certain kinds of environmental stimuli. The organism's environment (and its objects) is, then, organized in terms of possible actions that the physically embodied agent is able to carry out towards its structures on the basis of its sensorimotor make-up.
5 For Mead, the very concept of an object is to be equated with "such an organization of a great group of nervous elements as will lead to conduct with reference to the objects about us" (Mead 1934 (Mead /1967 :
If one approaches a distant object he approaches it with reference to what he is going to do when he arrives there. If one is approaching a hammer he is muscularly all ready to seize the handle of the hammer. The later stages of the act are present in the early stages -not simply in the sense that they are all ready to go off, but in the sense that they serve to control the process itself.
Attitudes control the process of goal-directed behavior from the very beginning until its successful completion. Hence, according to thinkers like Mead, in the process of cognition, perception is not separable from action for it controls the process of action as a goaldirected behavior from the very beginning until its successful completion. By the same token, action (its motor component) often transforms the character of perceptual experience. From the pragmatist perspective, both the organism and the environment enter into what the philosopher of cognitive science Andy Clark calls "perception-action-loops" (2008, 71) . Through motion, the active organism continuously affects the character of its perceptual 4 At first glance, it might seem as if the notions of attitudes and impulses were interchangeable in Mead's philosophy of psychology. Both of them, after all, refer to organism's inherent tendencies to react in certain ways towards specific environmental stimuli. This equation is, however, not quite accurate. Whereas impulses (like hunger, anger, sexual attraction, or nurturing) are inborn and rather rigid, attitudes, like their bodily expressions-habits, basically refer to sensorimotor strategies acquired by organisms in the course of their embodied coping with environmental structures and events. 5 Mark Johnson, referring to the work of the Italian neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, arrives at a very similar notion when he writes that a concept of an object is: "a model of structures of recurring organism-environment coupling, and it is a model for possible perceptions and actions that one might experience" (2007, 159, original italics). experience, just as the character of perceptual experience affects the ways in which the organism moves when going about its business in the environment. We can, therefore, agree with Alva Noë in saying that: "perception depends on the possession and exercise of a certain kind of practical knowledge" 6 (2004, 33) . Perception, and in the broader sense-cognition, are two distinct phases of the life process. In other words, they are nothing but the means of our exploratory, dynamic engagement with the environment.
Mead's concept of a teleology of attitudes, built upon Dewey's model of organic action, has recently been reinforced due to recent extensive research into mirror neurons, 7 and especially the subset of canonical neurons. To cut a long story short, canonical neurons, like mirror neurons, belong to the neurological wiring which is responsible for sensorimotor operations. Canonical neurons, specifically, seem to be responsible for processes of transforming visual information regarding an object into appropriate motor acts in response to this sensory stimulation (for an extensive explanation of the function of canonical neurons see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 79-115) . Referring explicitly to Mead, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia claim that: ' We look because we handle, and we are able to handle because we look', are the words used almost a century ago by George Herbert Mead to emphasize how perception would not be possible 'without a continued control of such an organ as that of vision by such an organ as that of the hand, and vice versa'. Without this mutual control we would not be able to pick up our cup of coffee. However the analysis of the visuo-motor transformations operated by the AIP-FS neurons indicates that the seeing which guides the hand is also (and above all) seeing with the hand, by which the object is immediately coded as a given set of invitations to act (2008, 50).
The world is not given to us as a neutral set of self-evident objects but as a virtual space of practical action. On empirical grounds, the findings of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia confirm not only the very intimate connection between perception and action, but also the goal-directed nature of action in certain higher-order organisms. 8 In the life process, 6 Daniel D. Hutto and Eric Myin (2013) contest Noë's usage of the term "knowledge" for being too intelectualistic. I myself take their position to be a little extreme. Noë clearly explains his usage of the term "practical knowledge" in Noë (2013) . 7 As widely known, mirror neurons were somewhat serendipitiously discovered by a group of Italian neuroscientists led by Giacomo Rizzolatti during their research of the F5 area in the ventral premotor cortex of primates, which is responsible for grasping and manipulating objects. Rizzolatti's team noticed that certain groups of neurons fired not only when a primate was executing a certain motor action but, surprisingly, also when one primate was merely watching another primate (or a sufficiently similar subject, including humans) doing the same thing. Mirror neurons, present also in human neurological make-up, are thus responsible for both visual perception as well as motor production of certain goal-directed actions. The discovery of mirror neurons also has profound implications for contemporary assessment of Mead's views on social cognition. However, as this paper deals primarily with individual cognition, the subject-matter relating to social cognition will need to be omitted. For an insightful treatment of that topic, however, see, e.g.: Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008); Iacoboni (2008) . 8 Analogically to Mead's example of grasping a hammer, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia provide their own example with grasping a cup of coffee: "[w]e will grasp it in different ways depending on whether we are picking it up to drink from it, to rinse it, or simply to move it from one place to another. Moreover, our grip on the cup varies according to the circumstances, whether we are afraid of burning our fingers, or the cup is surrounded by other objects; it will also be influenced by our customs, habits, and our inclination to adhere to certain social rules and so on" (ibid., 36-37).
Marek McGann for instance, claims: "interaction is always going to involve some aspect of goal-directed activity on the part of the perceiving agent. It is such activity that drives the exploration of the world in the first place, and gives value to the interaction" (McGann 2010, 85) . Along similar lines, Daniel D. Hutto (2011, 37) notes:
Specifying the phenomenal character of any token experience therefore depends upon the particular goal-driven patterns that are occurrently instantiated in the way that sentient beings are interacting and engaging with aspects of the world.
In opposition to the intellectualist tradition of most of the Western philosophical tradition, pragmatic naturalists claim that our knowledge of the world does not primarily take on the form of explicit, language-like knowledge (knowing-that), articulable in terms of propositional mental content. Rather, the knowledge of the world should be primarily viewed as a bodily, practical attunement of the living organism to its world:
Intelligence and understanding are rooted not in the presence and manipulation of explicit, language-like data structures, but in something more earthy: the tuning of basic responses to a real world that enables an embodied organism to sense, act, and survive (Clark 1997, 4) .
The abovementioned findings in mirror neuron research seem to indicate that Mead, in pursuing an explanation of intelligent action, was (given the level of empirical knowledge of neurophysiology in his times) basically on the right track with his concept of attitudes. If we now recall that, in Mead's embodied approach, the concept of object is to be defined as the organization of neural paths that will lead to specific ways of conduct with reference to certain perceptual stimuli, we can see why he calls distant perceptual objects "invitations to action" (1938, 12) . In Mead's own words: "Man lives in the world of Meaning. What he sees and hears means what he will or might handle" (1926/1964, 294) .
Beyond the subject/object dichotomy: affordances and perspectives
From the viewpoint of pragmatic naturalism, it is clear that living creatures are to be thought of as active explorers and seekers of environmental stimuli, rather than passive recipients thereof. In accordance with Dewey's notion of experience as the process of doing and undergoing (cf. Dewey 1934 Dewey /1980 , we could claim that, by means of their behavior and form of embodiment, organisms actively affect and change their environments just like the environments, in turn, change and affect the organisms living in them: "an animal with the power of digesting and assimilating what could not before be digested and assimilated is the condition for the appearance of food in his environment" (Mead 1938, 334 ). Mead's vision of nature is, thus, deeply ecological. The character of the organism is determined by its membership in a system; in a similar manner, however, the character of the system is determined by the activity of the organism. In the process of their ongoing transactions, the organism and its environment thus enter into what Clark has called continuous reciprocal causation which "occurs when some system is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by activity in some other system" (2008, 24) . The character of the organism as well as its environment is, therefore, formed on the basis of their mutual constitutive relations. Mead called these objective relations perspectives. Following Whitehead (whose philosophy of nature was the decisive element in the formation of Mead's perspectivism), Mead strongly opposed the idealistic reading of the term "perspective" as "hopelessly infected with subjectivity and consequently unreal" (1926/1964, 306) . Au contraire, in Meadian rendition, perspectives are sets or orders of relations which are objectively situated in nature. They are not to be found in the realm of consciousness, but rather should be seen as "an aspect of nature, not simply of nature in relation to experience" (Ryder 2013, 55) . In their mutual relation, both an organism and its environment form a perspective.
What this means with respect to the goal-directed character of the behavior of living systems can best be demonstrated by James Gibson's notion of affordances. According to Gibson (1979, 127): affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill … I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.
In other words, affordances of the environment are the opportunities and/or possibilities for action that a particular environment offers to a specific kind of an embodied agent.
9 As the comparative psychologist Louise Barrett (2011, 98) 
makes clear:
This also means that physically the same environment can offer different affordances to different organisms, because they possess different kinds of bodies that differ in their sensorimotor capacities. What the particular environment looks like for the organism is, thus, determined by its physiological make-up and particular life history: the individual organism determines in some sense its own environment by its sensitivity. The only environment to which the organism can react is one that its sensitivity reveals. The sort of environment that can exist for the organism, then, is one that the organism in some sense determines (Mead 1934 (Mead /1967 .
Although perspectives are organism-dependent, they cannot be simply dismissed as subjective since they are objectively related, on the one hand, to the the organism's embodiment, and on the other, to the environmental structures that enable the very living process to continue. I am convinced that Mead would agree with one of the most profound contemporary advocates of relativism, Joseph Margolis, that: "there is no principled epistemic disjunction between the independent actual world and the world we experience and claim to know" (1995, 57) . Mead denied that perspectives are only different viewpoints on the one and the same real world. There exists no world independent of any perspectives just as there exists no Absolute which would encompass all the perspectives at once: 10 "The real cause of relativity is the inability to find any fixed system of reference, i.e., any absolute into which all else can be translated. Perspectives are all that is left" (Mead in de Waal 2002, 29) . Perspectives are nevertheless as objective as anything can get, which can be demonstrated when we try to put them in the context of the discussion between pragmatism and contemporary views on situated cognition. Affordances, manifesting themselves within perspectives, belong neither to the organism nor to the environment exclusively, but come into existence as objective relations arising out of proper organism-environment coupling.
11 In that respect, the philosopher of cognitive science Anthony Chemero (2003, 186) argues that Gibson's ecological psychology is a descendent of the radical empiricism of William James. This reading also points to the more general pragmatist contention, articulated precisely by James in his Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912) , that not only perceptual objects, but also their relations, should be viewed as sharing an equal claim for being real. That is to say, objects affording certain courses of action for concrete embodied agents can only arise within an objective relation of the perspective. In that reading, it would actually be incoherent to see these objects as real without granting equal reality to the very conditions of their existence.
A case for constructive realism I am convinced that such a notion of radical relationality reinforces rather than undermines our practical urge to rely on the external world. Gibson's ecological psychology, Mead's notion of the objective reality of perspectives and also James' radical empiricism, all based on a well-founded and reasonable view of a thoroughgoing organism-environment coupling, point in the direction of supporting the notion of direct perception in which the act of perception includes the object perceived. 12 In that respect, Philippe Rochat notes that the environment and the perceptual systems co-evolved in such a way that organisms living in their natural environments are pre-adapted to harvest information directly from the external environmental structures, instead of always storing them in their heads (cf. Rochat 2009, 10) . Perceptual objects are not mental items (representations); on the contrary, we make them present by means of our skillful involvement with the world through attitudes and bodily habits:
The perceptual object is primarily the organization of the immediate environment with reference to the organism. Perception here has no other significance than that of the sense apparatus in its adjustment to the environment… (Mead 1938, 16) .
From this perspective, it is unnecessary to create rich models of external reality in our heads when the world itself is accessible to us via our pre-reflective, bodily skills that enable us to retrieve and use the information that we need from its very structures. Pragmatists, therefore, hold that cognition should not be viewed as creating models of the world but instead as creating models of interaction with the world.
If the organism is radically embedded in the world via its sensorimotor apparatus and skillful habitual attunement, it certainly is most reasonable to maintain that this world is at the organism's "first-hand disposal". 13 Going down the path of this pragmatistic logic of radical Darwinism, then, we should expect that bodily cognitive structures (events in the CNS, bodily skills, habits, etc.) in an organism have evolved in conjunction with, and therefore, also function in conjunction with, the environment itself. In this respect, Clark quite expressively writes about what he calles the 007 principle: "In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in costly ways when they can use the structure of the environment and their operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing operations concerned" (1997, 46) . As Mark Rowlands argues, from the evolutionary point of view, organisms that have learned how to enact the environment (i.e., those that use the strategy of evolving a combination of internal cognitive strategies plus a bodily ability to manipulate and exploit the environment in appropriate ways) are evolutionarily better-off than those that need to create and store all the information at their own energetic expense in order to act in the ever-changing world (2003, 166) .
Mead held that not only is intelligence and consciousness an effect of environmental pressures, but that intelligence, once in place, actively re-shapes and adjusts its environment so as to better perform its tasks: "What is peculiar to intelligence is that it is a change that involves a mutual reorganization, an adjustment in the organism and a reconstitution of the environment" (1932, 4). Clark calls this systematic, intelligent way of reorganizing the identical object can be simultaneously present at two different places (two private minds). James decisively resolved the problem of mereology in his late essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" in which he denied the existence of consciousness as some sort of mental space or stuff in favor of a notion of consciousness as a function of experience that crosses the boundaries of our skulls and directly engages environmental structures. Cf. James (1922, 1-38) . 13 "We can approach the noumenal nature of reality only through the noumenal nature of thought … the experience in which human beings are involved is a constituent part of the reality which they judge; that the problems do not arise in minds which regard nature from without but within nature itself, because these human beings are phases of nature" (Mead 1929 (Mead /1964 . environment "cognitive niche construction" and defines it as: "the process by which animals build physical structures that transform problem spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain or domains" (2008, 62).
14 There are no empty niches or empty perspectives; both these terms require the objective, social relation between an organism and the environment. 15 As W. Teed Rockwell (2005, 97 ) reminds us, however, there can be two or more niches occupying roughly the same physical space, although never interacting, that is to say-never existing for the organism in another frame of reference: An organism's environment does not include all of reality, not even all aspects of reality within the organism's vicinity. It only includes those parts of the outside world with which the organism has some functional relationship.
The world arises for us only insofar as we are wired-up for it to show up. The organic process, to a greater or lesser extent, always "reveals" certain parts of the world by means of its being coupled to some of its structures. This is what Mead called "a perspective". Mead's notion of perspectives, I believe, makes a strong case for what we could call a constructive realism. 16 The external world is neither entirely constructed, nor unproblematically given. For embodied creatures like us, the world possesses as many objective qualities as there are ways to systematically interact with it (it arises as a result of intelligent action on its structures). Objects and events, existing within a perspective, are co-constructed by organisms that are able to enact them. If they are, these objects and events exist objectively. From the pragmatist point of view, therefore (somewhat paradoxically)-anything that is objective must be, at the same time, constructed, and nothing that is constructed cannot be other than objective.
